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6 Cosmopolitanism and republican 
citizenship 
Steven Slaughter 
In recent years there has been a revival of republican conceptions of poli-
tical theory and citizenship.l This revival has been notably championed by 
the neo-roman republican conception of republicanism as articulated by 
Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit. While arguments mounted by scholars 
such as Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and David Miller have strongly 
defended the importance of national political community, it was the neo-
roman conception of citizenship that placed republican ideas closer to lib-
eralism by articulating a conception of liberty constituted by a republican 
state. However, within the context of accelerating spatial integration in the 
form of contemporary globalisation, scholars connected to the cosmopoli-
tan critique of state-bound political theory have increasingly questioned 
the feasibility of democracy and citizenship at the level of the state. The 
question for political theorists in general, and republicans in particular, 
is whether cosmopolitanism forecloses other, less global, structures of 
governance and citizenship. 
In what follows, I am going to argue that a broad understanding of 
cosmopolitanism opens up spaces for global forms of politics that fall short 
of a universal global democracy that is championed by cosmopolitans such 
as Anthony McGrew and David Held. As such, I will first examine the 
breadth of cosmopolitan political theory and then focus on the cosmopo-
litan argument for a global democracy. Then, I will turn to the neo-roman 
conception of citizenship and governance and examine the degree to which 
it exhibits universal or cosmopolitan elements. 
Cosmopolitan democracy 
Cosmopolitanism, or the idea of a world citizenship, was first expressed by 
Diogenes and the Stoics with the claim that 'each of us dwells, in effect, in 
two communities - the local community of our birth, and the community 
of human argument and aspiration' (Nussbaum 1996: 7). This cosmopoli-
tan claim is essentially that the human community is the one that should be 
supreme and thus forwards an unwavering commitment to the universal 
community of humanity and a sense of detachment from solely local or 
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national affiliations. It should be noted from the outset that cosmopoli-
tanism is not a 'monolithic' or exclusively liberal approach to politics 
(Rengger 2000: 463). While the universal value of individual humans is an 
important part of the cosmopolitan liberalism of Immanuel Kant, there are 
many tangents within cosmopolitanism. Some cosmopolitans such as 
Thomas Pogge emphasise the intrinsic universal value of humans being the 
'ultimate unit' of concern (Pogge 1992: 49). While others emphasise the 
development of global moral responsibility as tangible interdependence 
expands globally (Beitz 1979). There are also some who claim that the 
historic mutability of human community opens the possibility to an inclusive 
global community (Linklater 1998). 
However, cosmopolitans differ at an even more fundamentallevel. The 
crucial distinction within cosmopolitan theory is between the position of 
'political' cosmopolitanism on one hand, which advocates the creation of 
universal political institutions at a global level, and 'moral' cosmopolitan-
ism on the other, which advances universal principles that do not justify 
global institutions but 'the basis on which institutions should be justified or 
criticised' (Beitz 1999: 287). Both moral and political cosmopolitanism 
revolve around a moral obligation and identification with the human spe-
cies, but political cosmopolitans extend beyond this to include an account 
of global citizenship and democracy. This distinction is important because 
political cosmopolitanism seeks to provide the political infrastructure of a 
universal political community and democratic system that radically deli-
mits the state. This entails developing a world where all people have an 
input into a single global democracy. While this distinction is important, 
and the idea of a worldwide structure of government has a long history in 
Western thought, the placement of some authors within these positions is 
often the source of considerable debate. Immanuel Kant is a chief example 
of an author who is variously claimed to be a political or moral cosmo-
politan (Heater 1996). In contemporary times, political cosmopolitans are 
more forthright in their support for global institutions. While there are 
many examples of contemporary political cosmopolitan thought, the stron-
gest and clearest accounts of political cosmopolitanism are those of 
Daniele Archibugi, Richard Falk, Anthony McGrew, and especially David 
Held's defence of cosmopolitan democracy. 
The chief reason that there has been a strong revival of political cosmo-
politanism is that the context of world politics in the late twentieth century 
and early twenty-first century is seen by many to be travelling in a cosmo-
politan 'direction' 0 This context that is claimed by many cosmopolitans to 
be congenial for political cosmopolitanism includes accelerating globalisa-
tion; the increasing role of international organisations and non-govern-
mental organisations; an increase in the number of states that practise 
democracy around the world (Archibugi and Held 1995: 3); and 
the development of an extensive system of universal human rights law 
under the aegis of the UN. However much these developments point in a 
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cosmopolitan direction, they do not achieve the globally unified institu-
tions envisioned by those who support political cosmopolitanism, nor do 
they eliminate the sovereign authority of the state. This provides the con-
text from which scholars such as David Held launch their justification for 
cosmopolitan democracy. 
The starting point for Held is that the various processes of globalisation 
are radically delimiting the capacity of the democratic nation-state to have 
any real sense of control over its fate. He claims that substantive self-
government cannot be 'located within the boundaries of a single nation-
state alone' (Held 1998). Held argues that globalisation creates a series of 
'disjunctures', such as international law, the internationalisation of poli-
tical decision-making, international security structures, and the globalisa-
tion of culture and the world economy, that all cut across and constrain the 
democratic state's capacity to regulate its own fate (Held 1998). He main-
tains that because these disjunctures frustrate the congruence between a 
public and the state, that the state is not a viable location to enable people 
to govern themselves democratically. People will be both affected by 'out-
side' decisions and influences, and people within the state will affect others 
without recourse. In the context of globalisation, the only way to over-
come these disjunctures is to include everyone in decisions that affect them 
and thereby make the apposite site for democracy a global one. 
Indeed, the desire to globally extend democracy across states is the 
objective at the heart of political cosmopolitanism. It is required so that 
individuals and not states are enabled to be the primary moral agents in 
world politics. Held's justification for this rests not just on contemporary 
globalisation but on a support of Kant's principle of hospitality, which 
affirms that a foreigner should be tolerated and not 'treated as an enemy 
upon his arrival in another's country' because 'a transgression of rights in 
one place in the world is felt everywhere' (Kant 1983: 118-19). However, 
Held dramatically extends such principles beyond just conduct towards 
foreigners to include a fundamental respect for the rights of everybody 
foreseeably affected by a given political decision. In practice: 
universal hospitality must involve, at the minimum, both the enjoy-
ment of autonomy and respect for the necessary constraints on auton-
omy. That is to say, it must comprise mutual acknowledgments of, and 
respect for, the equal rights of others to pursue their own projects and 
life-plans. Moreover, in a highly interconnected world, 'others' include 
not just those found in the immediate community, but all those whose 
fates are interlocked in networks of economic, political and environ-
mental interaction. 
(Held 1998: 228) 
For universal hospitality to exist, a cosmopolitan legal system is required. 
Furthermore, this prescription of governance suggests that democracy 
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ought to be extended to a global level, so that both local and global pro-
blems can be addressed in an effective and globally inclusive manner. 
The animating force of Held's articulation of political cosmopolitanism 
is his conception of 'cosmopolitan democratic public law' - a common 
legal structure that is entrenched across and within a range of 'diverse 
political communities' and 'multiple citizenships' (Held 1998: 233). While 
Held argues for a global executive, constitution and the related para-
phernalia of government, at the heart of his account is a willingness to 
develop global democratic structures that enable all people affected by a 
given process to have a say in the public policies aimed at addressing these 
global or regional problems (Held 1998: 278). Cosmopolitan democratic 
public law is a 'binding framework' that includes only those people likely 
to be affected by a given decision - local decisions like garbage collection 
will ~e made locally, while global decisions such as regulating greenhouse 
gas emissions would be made by everybody (Held 1998: 233). Richard 
Falk refers to this as a movement towards a global constitution which 
represents the 'intensified continuation' of the emergent normative and 
institutional framework already under way during the twentieth century 
under the aegis of the UN - not just a milder form of moral cosmopoli-
tanism or liberal internationalism (Falk 1991: 7), Therefore global con-
stitutionalism entails a strengthening of the rule of international law by 
entrenching the judicial resolution of interstate disputes and embedding 
transnational social actors into global governance. While these cosmopoli-
tan aspirations are sometimes embodied in law as it presently stands, Held 
seeks to embed cosmopolitan practices into am overarching body of cos-
mopolitan democratic law. 
It is important to state that Held does not argue for a simplistic model of 
world government, but rather a flexible and complex model of democracy 
at a global level where citizenship is held by all people. As Anthony 
McGrew maintains, cosmopolitanism is defined by the principle of 'heter-
archy', which entails a 'divided authority system subject to cosmopolitan 
democratic law' rather than hierarchy (McGrew 1997: 250). Thus cosmo-
politan law is embedded at all levels of global political life: states are not 
the only form of governance operating within cosmopolitan democracy. 
City-states, communities, and even functional organisations such as TNCs 
will be subject to cosmopolitan democratic law. This also raises the distinct 
need for clear rules to determine what sorts of issues are dealt with at 
which level of governance. Held's response to this question is to establish a 
boundary court that determines public issues on the basis of the number of 
people affected, the intensity of effect of the issue on people and the 
'comparative efficiency' of why lower levels of governance cannot deal 
with the issue (Held 1998: 236). This legal requirement, and the long-term 
plans for cosmopolitan democracy by Held, means that the legal-political 
fabric of this model is elaborate, and fuels fears of cosmopolitanism's crit-
ics that the cosmopolitan model is indeed a model for a world government. 
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By contrast, moral cosmopolitanism does not involve developing such 
elaborate structures. Moral cosmopolitans would be satisfied with the ela-
boration and substantiation of human rights and democracy in states 
across the world as well as foreign policy being guided by principles of 
restraint in regards to conflict and compassion to foreigners. As such, 
moral cosmopolitanism - a basic universal concern for human welfare and 
dignity - can be found in much of liberal thought, some strands of social 
democratic thought and, I would argue, republican thought. 
Republican democracy 
The contemporary revival of republicanism has centred on republicanism 
being different from both liberalism and communitarianism (Pettit 1999: 
7-8). The revival of neo-roman republicanism political theory is attribu-
table to writers such as Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit and Maurizio Viroli. 
These writers have emphasised republicanism's critique of both liberalism, 
for its asocial view of freedom, and communitarianism, for the idea that 
involvement in a pre-political community can define or sustain freedom 
(Brugger 1999: 12-14). The neo-roman strand of republicanism empha-
sises a series of interlocking civic ethics and institutions that are intent on 
establishing liberty as a civic achievement that requires an institutionalised 
context where citizens are free from subordination or domination. Conse-
quently, republicanism's conception of liberty is one of 'non-domination' 
(Pettit 1999), a context that entails a sensitivity to the capacity of arbitrary 
intervention in people's lives or the dependence of people on the goodwill 
of others. This conception of liberty reflects a concern with the ways 
ambition, self-interest and powerful private or factional interests can cor-
rupt the body politic and usher in domination and a dependency on the 
goodwill of these interests. The objective of non-domination is for indivi-
duals to be free from both imperium, that is domination by the state, and 
from dominium, meaning domination by sectional interests within society 
(Pettit 1999: 13). Republicanism stresses that transparent, publicly governed 
state power is the way to construct liberty. Pettit contends that liberty 
defined as non-domination 'comes about only by design' (Pettit 1999: 122). 
A requisite in the design that achieves this liberty is the publicly directed 
and constrained exercise of power by a republican state. Pettit has referred 
to this activity as a form of 'antipower' where 'the power of some over 
others - the power of some over others in the sense associated with 
domination - is actively reduced and eliminated' (Pettit 1999: 588-89). 
Thus it is not just well intentioned laws that help enact the republican 
conception of liberty. It is that laws backed by the publicly directed use of 
power can actually counteract multifarious forms of vulnerability and 
domination. The design of enacting non-domination requires that the 
exercise of public power is structured and delimited within a republic. A 
republic is a state where sovereignty is 'located in the people' even if the 
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actual exercise of authority is delegated across a range of institutions and 
governments (Deudney 1996: 197). Such authority is both defined and 
constrained by the principle of self-government that is focused on the 
common or public good of its resident citizens (Skinner 1992: 217). The 
republican conception of the public good is not a pre-political conception 
of the good life, nor an aggregation of individual interests. Rather it is a 
common interest in goods that are not able to be obtained individually -
particularly a dependable and extensive sense of liberty and mutual respect 
(Pettit 1999: 284). Non-domination is a shared and constitutive condition 
that is typified by a secure and peaceful environment for individuals to live 
their chosen Jives. However, maintaining the public good requires con-
stituent citizens' political participation and responsibility. Thus a republic 
is both an institutional assemblage and a political association encompass-
ing ~embers of a public united around a concern for their mutual liberty. 
These interlocking ethics and practices converge on the observation that 
liberty can only be realised when citizens act together to control power in 
order to avoid both domination by particular interests and preventable 
vulnerability. Consequently, republican citizenship is not merely a status, 
or the right to be politically involved, but an active ongoing duty and an 
ongoing stake in the political operation of the state in which citizens 
reside. Pettit regards this practical conception of republicanism as 'gas-and-
water-works republicanism' that departs from romantic accounts of 
republicanism or democracy - it does not require a step back to positive 
liberty or the 'liberty of the ancients' (Pettit 1999: 239). Republicanism 
unites the demand for virtue and civic activity on the part of citizens with 
public institutions in order to contest power and construct institutions that 
secure the protection of citizens from domination. 
The question remains whether republican citizenship is inherently natio-
nalistic or communitarian. The answer is no, although republicanism is not 
purely cosmopolitan either. I contend that the republican practice of citi-
zenship and the notion of 'the public' are unavoidably particularist in the 
sense that they develop from actual ongoing forms of common political 
association (Viroli 1995: 13). While some communitarians and republicans 
claim that nationality may well be a 'partial replacement' for patriotism in 
the modern world (Miller 2000: 67), national forms of solidarity are not 
sufficient for the active political motivation and participation embedded in 
the practice of patriotism (Viroli 1995: 11-13). Patriotism and citizenship 
are active practices that are 'sustained by shared memories of [aJ commit-
ment to liberty, social criticism, and resistance against oppression and cor-
ruption' (Viroli 1995: 13). Mauritizo Viroli makes the distinction between 
republicanism and nationalism by arguing that republicanism invokes an 
ongoing 'love of the political institutions and the way of life that sustain 
the common liberty of a people' rather than a love of a nation's 'cultural, 
linguistic and ethnic oneness' (Viroli 1995: 1). Nor does republicanism 
stipulate a blinding righteousness. In fact, patriotic citizenship is demanding 
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exactly because it requires a moral commitment to open-mindedness 
beyond citizens' own private interests, a political involvement in the 
development of the public good and personal vigilance in the face of 
threats to the republic. Such commitment, solidarity, and passion are only 
enabled by people feeling that they are 'part of something' (Viroli 1995: 
13). Ultimately then, republicanism does not necessarily embed any ethnic 
or nationalistic norms or conception of the good life other than norms that 
entail public responsibility and oversight over a particular set of political 
institutions. These norms reflect the social nature of the morality that 
constitutes non-domination (Pettit 1999: 8). 
So while republicanism is not nationalistic it is still dependent upon a 
civic culture that constitutes and develops a context of non-domination. 
This is where the contrast with liberalism is made clear. Republicanism 
does not embrace the social atomism embedded within liberal citizenship 
and does not embrace the idea of a minimal state with few regulatory 
powers. Republicanism is dependent upon a particular public ethos which 
entails that citizens cherish the institutions that act as a bulwark against 
arbitrary forms of power, but also requires that these citizens are actively 
'political' in the sense that individuals 'respect other citizens' liberty, and to 
discharge their civic duties" in addition to being wary and vigilant in 
respect to potential threats to the public good (Viroli 1995: 45). At an 
ethical level the values of civility and patriotism become guiding norms of 
political life, while at an institutional level, forums and avenues of demo-
cratic oversight over the working of authority are indispensable to facil-
itating non-domination. It is impossible to see republican citizenship in 
isolation, as the practice is deeply connected with an appropriately 
empowered state that is actively directed to moderate public and private 
forms of domination. 
So the question is, how do republican ideas operate in relation to inter-
national politics? While cosmopolitan ideas seem well suited to a context 
of accelerating globalisation, at first glance the statist inclination of 
republicanism does not seem to fit this context as well. While republican-
ism connotes the unavoidable necessity of the state, I am going to argue 
that the republican legacy in international affairs unsettles the notion that 
republicanism is a form of statism or realism because the design of the 
republic does not stop at the borders of republican-constituted states. 
Ultimately, the republican state is only possible within a wider association 
of republican states and international institutions set up by republican 
states. Interstate cooperation and institutionalisation are crucial to repub-
lican aims - even though these forms of governance cannot in and of 
themselves construct the civic liberty of republicanism. According to Pettit, 
judicial sovereignty is not 'sacred', indeed: 
it is going to be in the interest of the republican state to encourage 
different layers of multinational cooperation and institutionalization ... 
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while the republican state represents an indispensable means of fur-
thering people's non-domination ... there are some domestic issues on 
which it may be better from the point of view of promoting freedom as 
non-domination to give over control to those bodies and thereby to 
restrict the local state. 
(Pettit 1999: 152) 
This construction would require checks and balances within these institu-
tions as well as institutional transparency and oversight by the publics 
from constituent states. Despite the dangers of possible domination by 
distant bodies, well crafted institutional arrangements that bind states and 
the delegation of popular sovereignty are not just consistent with repub-
licanism but constitutive of republicanism's efforts to actively suppress 
domination. 
These forms of cooperation would be aimed at enabling states to address 
transnational problems so republics can have meaningful public delibera-
tions and realise a condition of non-domination. Republicanism would 
support the regulation of the various forms of transnational activity that 
transmit the capacity to dominate people, such as environmental degrada-
tion or transnational crime. Also these measures would stabilise and reg-
ulate economic cOl:mections between states, so that republican states are 
not competing against each other for regulatory standards or dominated by 
mobile capitalist interests. I also think one of the most distinctive elements 
of republicanism in the international sphere would be a promotion of 
state-building and development. In pursuing this goal of individual 
empowerment to prevent domination, the promotion of development 
assistance for developing countries would be an important goal even if the 
promotion of republican values and institutions were not immediately 
possible. It must be stressed that the ultimate objective of global civic 
republicanism is always the empowerment of people. The ethos of repub-
licanism seeks to promote the 'basic capabilities that are required for 
functioning in the local culture' and as such the promotion of human 
development is central to this ethos (Pettit 1999: 158-59). 
Consequently, republicanism can be seen to advocate both the building 
of complex forms of inter-state cooperation and a civically minded public 
in states around the world (Hudson 2003). While the republican legacy in 
international affairs could be read as either endorsing the broadening of 
the extended nature of popular sovereignty across states or of extending 
the act of mutual binding between popularly sovereign states, for my part I 
think that the choice between a global public and states that are respon-
sible to their resident citizens collapse on each other in the sense that 
effective public control of states now requires citizens to think globally. 
While republicanism requires a significant change in the way people live 
the idea of political responsibility within their state in the form of patri-
otism and citizenship, it also requires citizens to be globally conscious and 
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responsible. So while republican citizenship is in contradiction with being a 
'citizen of the world' and political cosmopolitanism, the contrast with moral 
cosmopolitanism is far less problematic. I now turn to an exploration of 
some of these intersections with both moral and political cosmopolitanism. 
Cosmopolitanism and republicanism 
While there are certain sympathies between cosmopolitanism and repub-
licanism, the differences are sufficient to be wary of attempts to simply 
conflate the two political projects. However, there are three good reasons 
why there is some convergence between republicanism and moral cosmo-
politanism. First, patriotism is not in contradiction with a concern for 
humanity. Republicans contend that the patriotic citizenship that animates 
the republican state is not 'exclusive' or a hindrance to forms of transna-
tional solidarity and hospitality (Viroli 1995: 12). Second, a republican-
inspired citizenry and state would see 'the domination of others as cause 
for real moral and political concern' (Rattan 2001: 127). Thus, repub-
licanism can be seen to be morally cosmopolitan in the sense that it values 
the liberty of all human beings, even if it does not suggest that a unified 
political order is a possible way to achieve this. While non-domination is a 
universal value, the way this value is realised is inherently particularist in 
that republicanism sees the only way to promote liberty is by enabling 
people to have an empowered state that is carefully guided by its citizens. 
While non-domination is a universal goal, it cannot be achieved by uni-
versal means. Last, for purely prudential reasons republican concern for 
domination must necessarily extend globally. The goal of non-domination 
does open up the need to construct forms of governance that act upon 
global forms of domination that cut across state borders. Republicanism 
clearly requires a concern for the practice of non-domination to be facili-
tated on a global or regional basis, in a way that balances state-bound 
public sentiment with global forms of peace and cooperation. 
Despite these overlaps with moral cosmopolitanism, republicanism is 
much less accommodating towards political cosmopolitanism. From a 
republican point of view there are many reasons to be wary of a cosmo-
politan political order. While republicans would be concerned with giving 
up the potentially constructive political allegiances and solidarities that do 
exist or could be reinvigorated at a local or national level, they would also 
be alarmed by the significant concentration of power in world politics that 
is quite distant from oversight or control, which is embedded in cosmopo-
litan democracy. Ultimately for republicans, the cosmopolitan development 
of a global public sentiment and participation that is able to provide for 
liberty is much more difficult to develop than political cosmopolitans 
acknowledge. The main republican argument against the viability of political 
cosmopolitanism is that it does not possess the power needed to address 
contemporary global problems. The protection provided to individuals by 
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political cosmopolitanism stems from the legal rights and redress provided 
by cosmopolitan law. Republicans assert that something more than 
abstract laws is required. Publicly directed power, that is, government 
structured around protecting the liberty particular to a given society, is 
essential to protect societies and address global problems. Thus, states can 
provide a context domestically and globally that is sensitive to global pro-
blems and is empowered to address these global problems without resort-
ing to the convolution of cosmopolitan democratic law. From the 
republican point of view, the public sentiment that stems from political 
cosmopolitanism is problematic for a series of interlocking reasons. 
The first problem facing the public sentiment stemming from political 
cosmopolitanism is that it is inherently abstract. The elaborate transfor-
mation in public sentiments and institutions that is sought by political 
cosmopolitanism may seem attractive given the scale and increasing sig-
nificance of problems that can only be addressed at a global level. After all, 
political cosmopolitanism seeks to narrow the authority of the state and 
broaden the political loyalties of its citizens. However, the shift away from 
states to a universal and global authority does not build upon existing 
institutions and sentiments, nor does it automatically address the social 
solidarity and legitimacy needed to empower institutions able to protect 
individuals from prevailing forms of power (Miller 2000: 70). The repub-
lican counterpoint is not just that this transformation is unnecessary 
because states can (and do) cooperate on matters without a cosmopolitan 
framework (Saward 2000; Neff 1999). Rather, the republican perspective 
is that 'free institutions are not a bright idea that can be dreamed up and 
voted in: they must expand upon or restore some traditional institution' 
(Crick 1998: 42). In contrast to the dramatic shift in authority and senti-
ment required by the approach of political cosmopolitanism, republicanism 
seeks to enhance and build upon the existing sentiments and structures of 
the state. As such, there is a strong element of pragmatism in the repub-
lican approach. It seeks to build upon the existing foundation by rework-
ing the already existing nature of the state and the collaboration of states 
rather than enact a new global system of governance. 
Interestingly, there are signs that the state is coming back to vogue in 
political thought and policy-making circles. Some neo-liberals are realising 
that some neo-liberal programmes of liberalisation and privatisation have 
gone too far or have been undertaken by countries that do not yet have the 
legal infrastructure to underpin vibrant capitalism. This has been indicated 
in recent shifts in World Bank and IMF policy towards what has become 
referred to as a 'Post Washington Consensus', a movement away from pure 
free markets to include a concern for the institutional conditions of the 
state and for development (among other policies) (Jayasuriya 2001). This 
point has also, surprisingly, been made by Francis Fukuyama in a recent 
article of his termed 'Bring Back the State' when he says that the 'excessive 
zeal in pursuing this "neo-liberal" agenda undermined the strength of states 
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to carry out those necessary residual government functions' (Fukuyama 
2004). While he defends the view that the state should be stronger he still 
thinks the state should have a rather narrow set of functions. I do not 
agree. I think that people in various parts of the world should choose what 
set of functions their state should deal with, not states as Fukuyama sug-
gests. I think the state should reflect the wishes of its public so far as is 
possible, so long as it does not dominate its people or people in other 
states. 
The second problem that republicanism has with political cosmopoli-
tanism is the functional vision of the 'public' arising from the emphasis on 
the role of regional and global layers of governance {as suggested by David 
Held} or NGOs (such as emphasised by Richard Falk). This functional 
approach to political association is most evident within Held's model of 
cosmopolitan democracy, where people engage in political practice on 
various levels of governance according to whether the issue at hand affects 
them (Saward 2000: 33-35; Miller 2000: 36-37). By contrast, republican 
practice entails the social process of people collectively creating a form of 
public power that is aimed at upholding their common interests on an 
ongoing basis. While falling short of an inward looking community or a 
defence of nationalism, republicanism is defined by a historically shaped 
sense of common responsibility for the state by its citizens. This ongoing 
activity creates what Michael Saward refers to as a 'baseline unit' that is 
foundational and not merely functional (Saward 2000: 36-37). I use the 
term foundational because it suggests that other forms of governance may 
be built on top of this 'level' of governance as well as suggesting that the 
republican state is a foundation -in terms of being the legitimate public 
authority. While republicanism supports the practice of NGOs (as well as 
regional and global layers of governance) and the important contestatory 
role they perform in contemporary global politics, it does not see these 
organisations as being the foundation of non-domination. To produce a 
context in which power is restrained, government must be publicly devel-
oped and directed within a culture of democracy that stems from a 
patriotic citizenry. The ongoing responsibility of citizenship is a crucial 
foundation for republican global governance. This attitude of the public 
construction of governance is central to republicanism in the sense that 
practices of contestation and delegation require citizens to see themselves 
as shapers of their state and now, ultimately, global forms of governance. 
The third problem that republicanism has with political cosmopolitan-
ism is that the power and authority arising from cosmopolitan democracy 
is intangible and removed from citizen oversight. Political cosmopolitanism 
takes an Archimedean and dispassionate starting point for authority in the 
shape of cosmopolitan law. While political cosmopolitanism is defined by 
'heterarchy' rather than hierarchy, there is still a de jure reallocation of 
authority towards the new centre of global legal authority (McGrew 1997: 
250). From a republican perspective there are concerns that if political 
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cosmopolitanism were to be too strong, it could become a tyrannical 
centralised power. If it were too weak or abstract, it would not stimulate 
citizens to act in ways to address the power of transnational capital or 
other highly organised and diffused networks of interest and or power, 
thereby allowing private forms of power to reign. By contrast, republican-
ism seeks to build authority from the bottom up in the sense that the 
reconstruction of civic ethics and structures that seek to constrain power 
within the state will ascend into higher layers of governance. For political 
cosmopolitanism, multi-level global governance constitutes different levels 
whereby people affected by an issue can influence the issue. For global 
civic republicanism, the global infrastructure of multi-level global govern-
ance would be an ongoing construction that augments rather than replaces 
the republican state. Republicanism suggests that civic states can build 
upon the forms of multilateral governance that have been aptly if not 
unevenly demonstrated within the last sixty years. In addition, the Eur-
opean Union has developed into a potential hope as to the ways citizens 
can discipline and transform multiple levels of governance and their state 
(Bellamy and Warleigh 1998; Bellamy and Castiglione 1998). Thus while 
there are multiple levels of governance that the state is enmeshed in, the 
purpose of this governance ought to be clearly aimed at enhancing oppor-
tunities for the state to protect its citizens. 
It is my contention that while there is the exercise of global politics, 
there is no global public. There is no sense of global patriotism that moti-
vates a 'thick' sense of global solidarity and reciprocity (Walzer 1994: 8; 
Barber 1996; Miller 2000: 72-77), or that encourages people to think 
beyond their own personal interests (Miller 2000: 77). There is no love of 
the UN, let alone the WTO. Ultimately, a context that is kept free from 
insecurity and vulnerability requires more than activists or policy-makers. 
It needs broad participation and a passionate sense of political involvement 
and consideration by citizens participating to enact their own liberty. 
Clearly, virtuous citizenship and political involvement is not being exer-
cised in democracies around the world. Republicanism seeks to overturn a 
culture of democracy typified by civic disengagement rather than stretching 
the scale of democracy. The chances are greater of mobilising people in the 
states in which they live to develop virtuous public involvement than 
developing such virtue in a larger and much more abstract context devoid 
of the history and 'familiar life-ways' that can mobilise commitment and 
citizenship (Walzer 1994: 8). As Falk asserts: 
citizens are now being challenged to reconfigure the outmoded 
dichotomy between undifferentiated patriotism and cosmopolitanism. 
If this challenge is met, the vitality of traditional patriotism can be 
restored, but only on the basis of extending ideas and practices of 
participation and accountability to transnational sites of struggle. 
(Falk 1996: 60) 
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This is certainly right but it understates the important struggles to develop 
the ethics of political responsibility within the state that motivates people 
to entrust considerable power to the state. Clearly, we need to avoid this 
'outmoded dichotomy' and be wary of patriotism and indeed nationalism, 
but we should not overlook the desire of people to create their own poli-
tical responses to contemporary globalisation and other forms of global 
power via public control of the state. While I concur with Falk in regards 
to the 'common commitment' between patriotism and cosmopolitanism to 
create a 'humane state' (Falk 1996: 60), and ultimately a humane world, I 
think the only feasible route is through enhancing patriotism and the civic 
concern for arbitrary power rather than enhancing cosmopolitanism. 
Nevertheless, a cosmopolitan awareness is clearly important to enabling 
globally astute citizens to be able to conduct civic activity that enacts a 
global concern for arbitrary power. 
Consequently, republicanism directly addresses the shortcomings of 
political cosmopolitanism while moving beyond moral cosmopolitanism. It 
fills in the missing step within cosmopolitan thought by asserting the 
importance of citizens collectively wielding the public power of their state 
in order to ward off vulnerability and insecurity, without resorting to inward 
looking nationalism or chauvinism. Republicanism, in contrast to political 
cosmopolitanism, sees the state as essential to the construction of liberty. 
That this public accomplishment develops within a broader structure of 
governance does not validate the potential of a cosmopolis able to provide 
non-domination or authorise a 'global republic' in the immediate future. 
Conclusion: the value of the republican legacy 
Republicanism offers a distinct alternative to that of political cosmopoli-
tanism, and it offers a more defined and forceful political approach to that 
of moral cosmopolitanism. The value of republicanism lies in being a 
potential alternative to cosmopolitan modes of politics and ethics. 
Although republicanism and cosmopolitanism have different lineages, there 
are important lessons to be learnt from the two approaches. The message 
that cosmopolitanism has for republicanism is that a concern for global 
forces and a concern for people outside the republican state is increasingly 
necessary for constructing durable non-domination at home. Globalisation 
is blurring the distinctions between foreign and domestic politics, as well as 
speeding up connections across national borders in ways that necessitate 
showing consideration for people outside the state. Moral cosmopolitan-
ism also wards off elements of chauvinism and xenophobia in political 
thought and practice. I do not think that there is anything in the republican 
legacy or the creation of patriotic cultures within states that is necessarily 
antagonistic with the need to be globally aware and tolerant. Indeed, for 
republican attitudes to endure in a globalising context, they will require 
cosmopolitan moments of reflection. 
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The republican advice for cosmopolitanism is simply that we need to 
strengthen forms of citizenship that do exist and buttress the development 
of public ethics that support and justify the responsible exercise of state 
power. Ultimately, the ideal of a global cosmopolis is a long way off, and 
the political cosmopolitan ideals of discarding the potential of the state, 
state citizenship and patriotism seem to miss a step in the development of 
global politics that is going to improve the human condition. The empha-
sis, according to republicans, should be on the culture of democracy rather 
than the scale of democracy, and while the reworking of this culture should 
include a moral cosmopolitan outlook, it should also avoid the dispassion 
and economism of prevailing forms of liberalism. The republican idea is 
that controlling power is essential to the creation of liberty, and that the 
state is the site which at present we could control through virtuous citi-
zenship. Thus the republican prescription is the promotion of patriotism 
and civic engagement within states around the world and the creation of 
elaborate international institutions, not only the creation of global values 
and institutions as cosmopolitans contend. 
Note 
1 This argument is developed further in Slaughter (2005). 
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